But the military question is only one part of the emerging regional equation. For Pakistan, the developments are arriving at a particularly difficult moment: Islamabad has recently entered a new defence arrangement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, while simultaneously maintaining diplomatic engagement with Iran. The result is a strategic dilemma that could test the meaning of Pakistan's new security commitments.
The Red Sea Conflict Is Entering a New Phase
Saudi Arabia's reported preparations represent a significant escalation from the relatively limited confrontation that had followed the 2022 Yemen truce. According to Reuters, Riyadh is considering an operation led by Yemeni forces on the ground, supported by Saudi air power. One option would focus on the territory around Bab el-Mandeb; another would involve coordinated operations across several Yemeni governorates. The precise timing remains uncertain, and the Saudi and Yemeni governments had not publicly confirmed the reported plans when Reuters published its investigation. The immediate objective is reportedly to reverse recent Houthi gains along the Red Sea coast. That matters because the Houthis' growing presence around the southern entrance to the Red Sea gives them influence over one of the world's most important maritime corridors. And that brings the issue far beyond Yemen.
Why Bab el-Mandeb Matters to Saudi Arabia
Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. Ships travelling between Asia and Europe through the Suez Canal depend on this route. Its strategic importance has increased further because the Strait of Hormuz has been severely disrupted by the wider Iran conflict. Reuters reported that Bab el-Mandeb has consequently become an even more important alternative maritime route.
For Saudi Arabia, the issue is not simply commercial shipping. The kingdom has faced repeated Houthi missile and drone attacks against its territory and energy infrastructure. On October 3, Reuters reported that fire and a large plume of smoke were seen near a Saudi Aramco facility in Riyadh, although there was no official confirmation of the cause and no immediate claim of responsibility. It would therefore be premature to connect that incident to the Houthis. The broader pattern, however, is clear: Riyadh is dealing simultaneously with maritime insecurity, attacks on its territory and threats to critical infrastructure. That helps explain why control of the Red Sea coastline has become a strategic priority.
As Saudi Arabia considers military action against the Houthis, Islamabad faces the difficult task of balancing its defence commitments to Riyadh with its relationship with Tehran.
By Geopolitical Analysis Desk, The Centre
03 October 2026 • 06:52 PM IST • 6 min read
The conflict around Yemen and the Red Sea is entering a potentially consequential phase. Saudi Arabia is reportedly preparing military options against the Houthis after the group expanded its position along Yemen's Red Sea coast and gained control of the Bab el-Mandeb area. According to Reuters, the options under consideration range from a focused coastal operation to a broader offensive involving several fronts inside Yemen.
Pakistan Enters the Equation
This is where the Saudi-Houthi confrontation becomes particularly important for Islamabad. On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, under which an armed attack against one member is to be treated as an attack against all three. The agreement has now encountered its first major regional security challenge.
Pakistan has already taken a clear public position on the Saudi side of the immediate security question. On September 29, Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said Pakistan would use “whatever means are available” to defend Saudi Arabia against the Iran-backed Houthis. He also said Pakistan's military capabilities would be available to Saudi Arabia under the new defence arrangement, although he did not confirm whether Pakistani forces had participated in airstrikes. Reuters has separately reported that Pakistan has supplied Saudi Arabia with military equipment, including air-defence systems, artillery and drones, while Pakistani military advisers are reportedly assisting Saudi counterparts in supporting Yemeni forces.
Reuters also reported that Pakistan has deployed tens of thousands of troops to Saudi Arabia for defensive duties, while Islamabad has not decided to send troops into Yemen in a combat role. That distinction could become increasingly important. Because defending Saudi territory and participating in an offensive inside Yemen are two very different levels of involvement.
Between Riyadh and Tehran
This is the difficult part for Pakistan. Islamabad has made its commitment to Saudi security increasingly explicit. Pakistan's military leadership has condemned Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and expressed solidarity with the kingdom and commitment to the security of Islam's holy sites. At the same time, Pakistan cannot simply ignore Iran.
The two countries share a long border, and Islamabad has an obvious interest in preventing the Yemen conflict from becoming another direct regional confrontation involving Tehran. That tension is now visible in Pakistan's own diplomacy. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said on October 2 that Iran had suggested political engagement with the Houthis rather than “kinetic action.” Dar described the proposal as a good-faith discussion between the two foreign ministers rather than a formal Iranian offer. He said the proposal would be discussed at an emergency meeting of the Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan defence pact in Riyadh.
This creates an unusually difficult equation for Islamabad. Pakistan has formally committed itself to Saudi security. It has publicly condemned the Houthi attacks. Its military relationship with Riyadh is deepening. Yet the alternative being placed on the table by Tehran is precisely the alternative that could prevent the confrontation from developing into a larger military conflict. The question is therefore no longer simply whether Pakistan supports Saudi Arabia. The question is how far that commitment extends if Saudi Arabia moves from defending itself to conducting a major offensive inside Yemen.
Why India Should Watch This
For India, this is not merely another episode in Yemen's long-running conflict. The Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb are part of the maritime network connecting India with Europe. Any prolonged disruption affects shipping routes, insurance costs, energy movements and the wider economics of India's trade with Europe and the Middle East.
But there is another reason to watch Pakistan closely. The Makkah defence agreement has created a new security arrangement involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye. Its first serious test is emerging not on the territory of one of its members, but around an Iran-aligned armed group in Yemen. Pakistan's response will therefore reveal something about what this new arrangement actually means in practice. If Islamabad's commitment to Saudi Arabia remains primarily defensive, the pact may develop principally as a mechanism for protecting member states and critical infrastructure.
If Pakistani military involvement expands into the Yemen theatre, however, the regional implications would be considerably broader. And Pakistan's dilemma is sharpened by the fact that Tehran is simultaneously seeking a political route while Riyadh is reportedly preparing military options. For India, the important story is therefore not simply Saudi Arabia versus the Houthis.
